Back to diplomacy 

O n July 14, 2015, following the lengthy negotiations, Iran and six world powers (the US, France, the UK, Germany, China and Russia) signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), aimed at limiting Iran’s nuclear activity in return for the gradual lifting of sanctions against it. Iran agreed not to enrich uranium to more than 3.67%, allowing IAEA inspectors to conduct checks and to reconfigure its enrichment facilities. In response, the international community should have lifted sanctions imposed over the nuclear program. 

However, in 2018, US President Donald Trump unilaterally withdrew from the nuclear deal and restored sanctions. Tehran honored its commitments for about a year, but the inefficiencies of Eurotroika and continued US pressure led Iran to announce its withdrawal from the agreement in 2020. 

In 2021, under the administration of US President Joe Biden, indirect nuclear talks between Iran and the US resumed in Vienna. However, continued mistrust between the parties and disagreements over IAEA oversight have undermined the process. Amid the uncertainty of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, the talks were frozen in mid-2022. Now, the possibility of replacing the nuclear agreement with new terms remains a key issue on the international agenda. 

In the spring of 2025, negotiations between Iran and the U.S. resumed with the aim of restoring and revising the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. The dialogue resumed without preconditions, touching only on nuclear and sanctions issues. Negotiations are indirectly mediated by Oman. Five rounds have been held so far. The first, third and fourth rounds were held on April 12, April 26 and May 11, in Muscat, while the second and fifth rounds were held on April 19 and May 23 in Rome. These discussions have taken on new political weight given regional tensions and economic pressures. Although the sides are still far from a final agreement, the very fact that negotiations are underway can be seen as a positive diplomatic sign.    

Five rounds of negotiations have created minimal conditions to restore mutual trust, converge on technical issues and prepare for an agreement, and the process is in a vulnerable interim stage. Without political will,  a willingness to make concessions on both sides and balancing external pressures, there can be no transition to a real agreement. 

Nuclear talks: old and new emphases

W hile Iran-US negotiations are based on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), there are a number of significant nuances.

Under the 2015 JCPOA, Iran was committed to limiting uranium enrichment to 3.67% purity for civilian purposes only and to store a maximum of 300kg enriched uranium for 15 years. Furthermore, Iran’s nuclear facilities at Fordow and Natanz were to be converted to civilian use only. The IAEA has been authorized to inspect Iran’s nuclear facilities for oversight purposes. However, Iran has refused to comply with the protocol since 2021, and has also dismantled IAEA monitoring equipment, leaving the agency with no up-to-date information on the program to date. 

For added security, a special mechanism for automatic renewal of sanctions, known as the Snapback Mechanism, was provided. It allowed any member of the JCPOA to claim a possible violation by Iran. If the claim was not resolved within a specified period, the matter would be referred to the UN Security Council, and if it was not resolved within 30 days, sanctions would be reinstated without the need for further consent.  

In return, the United States, the European Union and the United Nations agreed to gradually lift the economic sanctions imposed on Iran, which would allow it to return to the international financial system and provide some economic assistance. 

The 2025 negotiations differ both in content and in the mechanism used. At this stage, the US has taken a much tougher stance, insisting that Iran should not be able to enrich uranium at all. Iran, however, opposes, emphasizing that as a full member of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, it has legal grounds to enrich uranium. Nevertheless, Tehran has shown some flexibility by expressing its willingness to cease production of highly enriched material (20-60%) and to limit its stockpile of enriched uranium.  

It has been reported that during the talks, the parties are discussing a number of new mechanisms aimed at defusing tensions and ensuring more predictable development in the process. The most notable of these is the phased agreement model. Under this option, Iran would temporarily freeze its uranium enrichment program for example for 5 years, while the United States would begin to gradually ease sanctions over the same period. 

The agreement also provides for expanded oversight. This will include the Additional Protocol, which will allow the agency to conduct more in-depth and frequent inspections. In addition, 24-hour monitoring of enrichment facilities is planned through cameras and online surveillance systems, along with a mechanism for surprise inspections aimed at preventing undeclared nuclear activities.  

Possible cooperation with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in civilian nuclear programs is also being discussed. This initiative aims to increase transparency and regional trust and to create a broader partnership environment in the Middle East.

The main differences between the 2015 and 2025 processes are as follows: while uranium enrichment was previously permitted under certain conditions, the US is now proposing a total freeze model, eliminating any possibility of uranium enrichment. Whereas earlier restrictions were designed for the long term (10-15 years), discussions now tend to focus on short-term and incremental options. Additionally, the JCPOA was the result of multilateral negotiations in the 5+1 format, while the current process is mostly bilateral, between the US and Iran, mediated by Oman. The control mechanisms have not yet been finalized, but potential reforms or the introduction of new verification methods within the IAEA model are anticipated. 

The current negotiations are not merely aimed at reviving the 2015 JCPOA , but at establishing a new model based on the principles of mutual trust, phased implementation and verifiability. The parties seek to prevent the risk of military conflict and ensure stability in the region. However, the success of the negotiations will depend not only on technical agreements but also on the ability of the sides to resist domestic and regional pressures. 

The main motivation for Tehran’s approach 

T ehran maintains that its approach to the negotiations is based on respect for principles and defense of national interests. Tehran has repeatedly stressed that it is ready for dialogue on equal footing and mutual respect. This approach is in fact confirmed by a fact that the negotiations are being held in an indirect format, bypassing the direct talks previously proposed by the US. This is a clear signal that Iran’s principled stance has become to be heard. 

However, the proposal’s emphasis on the negotiating format cannot entirely obscure the fact that Iran’s current position is largely shaped by growing economic pressures. Although Tehran seeks to present its return to negotiations as driven solely by diplomatic principles, it is clear that the difficult economic situation has largely contributed to this decision. Iran’s economy continues to suffer under the US maximum pressure policy. According to official data, exchange rate volatility persists, inflation remains at double-digit levels, oil revenues remain unstable, and Iran’s detachment from the international banking system complicates the development of foreign economic relations. 

And it is in the face of this economic vulnerability that Tehran has expressed its willingness to return to the diplomatic process, even if it is done under the veil of principle. In fact, under the rhetoric of “diplomatic principle”, Iran is actively seeking practical solutions to the economic crisis. 

In this context, Iran’s stated readiness to start negotiations without preconditions can also be seen as a demonstration of flexibility, on the one hand, an attempt to alleviate economic pressure, and on the other hand, to avoid the impression of submission to external forces. 

Intra-political conflicts and internal dynamics of negotiations 

Although the Iranian government outwardly presents itself with a unified negotiating position, internally the issue is deeply polarized due to fundamental contradictions within the power structure. 

T he administration of President Masoud Pezeshkian, a moderate reformer, has sought to use the nuclear talks as a tool to alleviate the economic crisis. Pezeshkian, in line with his election promises, is prioritizing the restoration of foreign economic relations, especially in the oil and financial sectors. 

To that end, his Government was pursuing a more flexible and pragmatic approach, even if that would require some concessions on monitoring mechanisms or uranium enrichment levels.  

Pezeshkian’s team is convinced that it is impossible to stop the economic downturn without easing sanctions. And it is the inevitability of this problem that is pushing the presidential administration to accelerate the pace of negotiations against hardlines. 

On the other hand, the conservative wing as well as spiritual leader Ali Khamenei, continue to show a cautious and even uncertain stance on the negotiations. This stance is based on mistrust derived from the experience of the UN Security Council. “We must not go down the same wrong path again in which we believed the West and made concessions without guarantees,” Khamenei said in his speech.  

According to conservatives, Iran should adopt a “resistance economy” approach, develop domestic production, become independent of foreign investment and not tie the country’s future to external agreements.   

Advocates of this approach criticize any flexibility on the part of the Pezeshkian government, convinced that such a policy could be perceived as weakness and would prompt the West to intensify its pressure tactics.

Public opinion in Iran is also not united around any one stance. There is a clear sense of desperation among the middle and lower middle classes over the sharp deterioration of the economic situation, which creates a practical expectation that negotiations will yield concrete results. 

Trump’s dual diplomatic and politico-military approach 

T he current position of the US administration on the Iranian nuclear issue can be characterized as a dual approach, combining diplomatic initiatives and a strategy of hard pressure. This approach involves, on the one hand, the offer of negotiations and possible ways to reach an agreement, and on the other hand, clear threats and warnings of the use of force if Iran rejects the proposals.  

Trump notes that Iran has received an offer to restore the nuclear agreement, outwardly indicating that the US is abandoning its strategy of maximum pressure and acknowledging the need for dialogue. 

However, this proposal comes with a clear warning: “If Iran doesn’t come to an agreement, the consequences could be serious,” indicating that the US side is not sitting down at the negotiating table as an equal partner, but rather as a party from a position of strength.  

Possible positive impact of easing sanctions against Iran on Armenia 

Restoring the nuclear deal, especially if an atmosphere of mutual trust is established between the US and Iran, could help ease regional tensions significantly exacerbated by the 44-day war. Regional stability is a prerequisite without which neutral and long-term economic initiatives simply cannot be realized. 

The easing of international sanctions against Iran could have indirect but significant economic consequences for Armenia. Trade and economic relations between the two countries, previously hindered by logistical, infrastructural and financial constraints, may get a new breath of development. 

If the talks are successful, Iranian-Armenian cooperation is expected to deepen in a number of key areas, including energy, transport, trade and economic ties. Armenia, as a country bordering Iran to the north and at the same time maintaining constructive relations with the EU, EAEU and Iran, can theoretically act as a bridge between East and West.  

However, these opportunities face a number of significant challenges. Most major regional infrastructure projects are currently based on the active participation of Azerbaijan and Turkey, which essentially relegates Armenia’s participation to the background. In the North-South and East-West transport corridors, alternative routes are more considered through the territory of Georgia and Azerbaijan, bypassing Armenia. In addition, Armenia, which does not yet have a competitive, predictable and credible investment model, remains marginalized from important economic initiatives. 

Thus, the ongoing indirect nuclear talks between Iran and the U.S. signal the restoration of a diplomatic process, albeit a vulnerable one of strategic importance. Whereas the 2015 JCPOA was the result of multilateral cooperation with clear technical criteria, the 2025 process is marked by bilateral, incremental and more flexible approaches, without preconditions but against a backdrop of deepening mistrust. It is also clear, that Iran’s return to the negotiating table is not only due to ideological principles, but also to the intensity of economic pressure. 

Within Iran, there is a polarization of views on the negotiations between the pragmatic, economically driven approach of the reformers and the skepticism of the conservatives. On the international stage, the US continues to play a double game, simultaneously offering dialogue and maintaining the threat of force. The combination of all this shows that while returning to the negotiating table is diplomatic progress, the path to a final agreement depends on political will, a willingness to compromise and balancing external pressures.